Performance management in criminal justice organisations has become a prominent issue in many countries and has faced increasing criticisms by scholars and practitioners. In this regard it is important to examine empirically how performance frameworks work concretely. We do so through the empirical examination of "performance regimes", i.e. the sets of performance indicators, internal procedures, instruments and processes of internal accountability through which performance is defined, assessed and monitored work in police organisations.
Introduction
It is widely recognised that criminal justice organisations across the world are steered, monitored and assessed through a more or less complex variety of performance indicators reflecting three broad forces: political pressures to reduce crime and deliver economies; neo-managerial thinking favouring the detailed measurement of performance; and technological change facilitating the retrieval of data relating to performance. More specifically regarding policing, much has been written about the consequences of performance measurement and management, and in particular the impact of the pursuit of quantitative indicators of, and targets for, police performance on police actions and decision-making. In that respect four forms of consequences, essentially negative, have been identified. First, policing becomes overly focused on measurable activities, such as criminal detections, rather than other forms of problem-solving which may have no directly measurable outcomes but which are nevertheless socially beneficial, such as 'partnership policing' (for England and Wales, Crawford et al. 2005; Hough 2007; Cockcroft and Beatie 2009; Loveday 2006; de Maillard and Savage 2012; for Australia, Fleming and Scott 2008) .
Second, the pursuit of standardised and uniform performance indicators for policing has been associated with the rigidities of the centralization of policing through 'topdown' performance governance frameworks (for England and Wales, Fitzgerald et al. 2002; Loveday 2006; de Maillard and Savage 2012 ; for the US, Eterno and Silverman 2012; Sparrow, 2015) . Third, performance management has reinforced a culture of cynicism within police organisations ('ticking boxes'), increasing the divide between managers and frontline officers (Fitzgerald et al., 2002) . Fourth, pressures to demonstrate achievement of performance can lead to 'juggling' practices, such as the tactical under-recording of crimes, thus challenging police integrity (see Patrick 2011, for Britain; Matelly and Mouhanna 2007, for France; Eterno and Silverman 2012, Sparrow, 2015 , for the United States).
Interestingly, these criticisms have not been confined to the academic world.
In England (which will be the focus of this article), police chiefs, police representative bodies and politicians have also raised concerns about the directions which police performance management has been going, particularly in so far as they relate to a rigid and nationally-led performance framework. This critical dynamic, evidence (Neyroud, 2008) . The College of Policing, for instance, a professional body created in 2011, has sought to develop and diffuse within the English police an evidence-based approach to policing. Virtually all police forces have responded in some form to this agenda; the Metropolitan Police Service for instance has introduced an Evidence-Based Policing program recommending the "use of evidence to inform better and more efficient policing in London" (Stanko, 2012, p. 4 ).
These potential changes trigger an obvious question which is at the core of this paper: have the shifts in political orientation to police performance and the greater sophistication of performance approaches led in turn to the rise of a more advanced police performance model in English police forces?
Following reflection on the notion of a 'police performance regime' and the methodology of the research (1.), the paper proceeds to examine the association between police performance management (PPM) and the three dimensions of performance regime that can analytically distinguished: 'policing by numbers' (2.), the translation downwards through the police hierarchy (3.) and the temporal horizon of police activities (4.). What emerges is a picture of PPM as uneven, both within and between police organisations, as ambivalent and, in a number of respects, as fundamentally contradictory.
1. Analysing regimes of police performance using qualitative methodology
Traditional and advanced performance regimes
Although the term 'regime' might imply unity and coherence, we use it to embrace varying mixes of norms, values, priorities and forms of knowledge and information (Edwards and Hughes 2012) . Analysing performance regimes means examining sets of (more or less related) performance indicators, and the internal procedures, instruments and processes of internal accountability through which performance is defined, assessed and monitored. Police performance regimes can thus be defined in terms of the interplay between measures of police activity and how such measures are used through the various internal organisational processes to seek to produce particular organisational effects.
Police performance regimes may vary substantially. They vary significantly between nation states (de Maillard and Savage 2012) and vary over time within nation states; they can also vary between police organisations. To capture such variations, we can distinguish analytically between 'traditional' and 'advanced' models of police performance regimes.
'Traditional' police performance regimes, typical of performance management in the earlier stages of development of PPM, are characterised by:
• A framework which prioritises quantitative performance indicators and a central role given to target-setting; 'hitting targets' as an end in itself,
• Centrally driven organisational processes with a 'top-down' management style and the 'micro-management' of organisational units,
• A short-term time frame with an emphasis on achieving targets within the performance reporting cycle (quarterly, monthly, etc.).
The perceived shortcomings of the 'traditional' regime, as seen above, seems to have been a driving factor behind the emergence of a more 'reflective' performance regime that we refer to as the 'advanced' police performance regime, characterised by:
• Systems of performance measurement with a greater focus on qualitative measures (without denying the significance and utility of quantitative measures as such) and with performance targets seen increasingly as a means to an end rather than an end in themselves, and a focus on solving the problems which differential performance levels expose,
• Greater flexibility and professional discretion granted to lower levels of the police organisation to seek and find solutions to performance differentials and shortfalls,
• A greater emphasis on long-term goals and increasing organisational effectiveness.
These analytical distinctions between traditional and advanced PPM regimes relate to ways of thinking and behaving, cultural interpretations held within police about which should be the priorities, and how performance should be measured.
To track potential changes of performance regimes, two dimensions, organisational and occupational, will be examined in the rest of this paper. The former refers to organisational processes: how low-level police supervisors (sergeants) and middle managers (from inspectors to chief superintendents) may through their activities and orientations impact on the internal diffusion of performance management. The latter relates to professional subculture: how do supervisors and middle managers understand and perceive performance management and use performance indicators?
Methodological note
This paper is based on data gathered from two contrasting police forces in England, the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) with a predominantly urban population, the other a medium-sized 'county', or 'provincial', force with a mixed rural and urban geographical spread. We contend that findings from the study of the two forces can be generalised to policing nationally in England for two reasons. First that the MPS alone accounts for around one-fifth of police officers in the country.
Second, that policing in Britain has become increasingly standardised due to the influence of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and police chief associations (Savage et al 2000) .
Ideally, we would have wished not to identify either of our forces by name, but given the unique nature of the MPS it would have been obvious that which force it was. (Brown, 1996; Fielding, 1990) we were at risk of suffering the dilemma painted by Gary Marx, when he stated "much of the literature on controversial police topics breaks down into two categories:
uncritical work by well-informed insiders, and critical work by uninformed outsiders" (1988, xiii) . However, we contend that these concerns were at least largely mitigated by other factors. Firstly, in addition to interviews, we conducted a number of observational exercises (approximately 20 hours of observations in each force) of performance-related events, including force performance group meetings, daily management meetings and team briefings. Secondly, we were able to 'test' our findings with well-placed insiders with whom we established a close working relationship. Thirdly, we could to a certain extent cross check the information collected as we conducted around 15 interviews in each territorial area (see above).
Furthermore, we were somewhat surprised by the candour of many of our interviewees who could hardly be accused of presenting a 'corporate' line! Against this backcloth, we propose now to analyse the three dimensions of performance regimes mentioned above: numbers, hierarchy, and timing.
Policing by numbers? Reds and greens for the thin blue line
A recurring feature of our research is the centrality of numbers or data in the way middle managers and at a lesser degree supervisors define their activities, a centrality which induces contradictory orientations. More specifically, elements of the more traditional performance management regimes with their somewhat rigid and formulaic approach to the value of numbers sit alongside an alternative approach which is more oriented to a more reflexive use of numbers allied to problem-solving.
The centrality of figures for police middle-management: believers and sceptics
An overriding picture from our research is the centrality of 'working to numbers' within the daily routines of police middle managers. As in other sectors, police performance data is routinely presented in corporate dashboard form, with a colour-coded system of 'green, amber and red', flagging the degree of fit with set performance targets. Monthly, even weekly, data-based objectives were still routinely present within both forces. In the provincial force, one chief superintendent stated in relation to senior management that "they were more interested in your figures than your plan… They look at the greens, they look at the reds…" This statement reveals a form of schism within police management over the legitimacy of 'policing by numbers'. There seems to be dissent among police middle managers and supervisors around the relevance of targets and more generally the use of performance indicators in the management of police units (Cockroft, 2012) .
The reliability and relevance of performance data for police action is a matter of contention. In this respect, the divide within police organisational culture is more nuanced than the classic differentiation between 'street' and 'management' cops (Reuss-Ianni 1983) . Within management cops as such we would distinguish between 'believers' who see virtue in the 'healthy competition' which numbers and targets can create and the daily pressures this brings to improve performance, and 'sceptics' who are more guarded about what the pursuit of numerical targets can achieve.
Believers consider figures as reliable; to put it in the words of a detective sergeant who very regularly assessed his detectives, at the end of the day, "Stats 
A mixed economy of performance regimes
There appears to be a discernible and on-going shift within policing from a simple 'numbers game' to a more reflective problem-solving ethos, particularly in relation to uniformed policing functions, in which data is used not just for the purposes of target-setting but as intelligence to be used for proactive management.
Our interviews reveal a strong sense that the police performance regime has evolved in ways that were more creative than performance regimes of the past; the performance culture is shifting to one more characteristic of what we referred to earlier as an advanced regime. The increasing focus on problem solving can mean that numbers are treated as signs of underlying processes rather than as significant in themselves. In the MPS, this is captured by a police performance (or 'business') analyst commenting on the direction of PPM:
"The direction is that it should be more about processes and not so much about
numbers. So if a borough is not doing great in terms of numbers... that doesn't necessarily mean the performance is bad..." (M)
This means that judgements on the performance of policing units should involve an assessment of whether the processes attached to the numbers are appropriate or not. This entails a shift from the simple 'primacy of numbers' to one which treats numbers as signifiers of patterns and it is the significance of those patterns and solving problems they express which are becoming a more central concern. This problem-solving approach transforms performance data from being a totemic definition of what the police should aspire to, to being a source of intelligence for informed decision-making.
In turn this encourages a more intelligent use of data. In both forces middle managers talk positively about 'balanced scorecards', which involve linking different dimensions of performance to provide rich data for planning and decision- 
Translating targets downwards: the ambivalence of managerial accountability
One of the concerns of our research was with the ways in which targets for performance are translated, or not, as they are passed down the police hierarchy to the frontline -although we acknowledge that policing has always involved something of a struggle between management and the 'frontline' and never a simple 'top-down' process of transmission. We have explored this more within the context of police organisational/professional culture in another paper (de Maillard and Savage forthcoming).
Here we were concerned with the extent to which performance targets set for the organisation are translated into the actions and behaviours of individual officers. Such a process is aptly described by Sparrow (2015: 29): "Adversarial managerial styles exercised at high levels within a department tend to trickle all the way down, resulting in intolerable pressure on frontline officers and, ultimately, inappropriate forms of police action on the streets". What we found was a more complicated picture: invasive accountability and cascading pressure exist but may be counterbalanced by internal processes.
Invasive accountability for divisional commanders
Like in Compstat (Willis et al. 2007) , divisional commanders, typically at chief superintendent level (or in the MPS at Commander level) are at the fulcrum of the performance regime because they have to answer directly for the performance (or under-performance) of their geographical area to the chief officer team. In both forces monthly force level evaluation sessions (CrimeFighters in the MPS, Force
Performance Meetings in the provincial force) were set up and the senior management team utilise dedicated performance analyst teams to drill down into data and present profiles to be used to increase performance in the organisation.
The Compstat programme, developed by the New York Police Department, was notorious for exposing police commanders to management review events where 'their' performance was subjected to hostile examination (Eterno and Silverman, 2012; Moore 2003 These performance rituals were far more intense in the MPS than in the provincial force. In the MPS, divisional commanders never know fully what kind of questions they may receive from the senior officers, thus creating a form of permanent uncertainty:
"They pick on different bits each time and you go, 'what the hell is that?' and stuff you've not seen before… you are then given this thing and you think, 'where has this come from?' …… figures that you don't recognise and then you have to do a lot of work trying to work out what it is, where it's come from and what they are looking for" (M).
Furthermore, the assistant commissioner (AC) in charge of local policing for the MPS did not hesitate to challenge divisional commanders. An inspector recalls a scenario widely shared within the MPS:
"You hear the story that a chief superintendent was being asked 'who does that for you?', 'oh inspector x does it', so he [assistant commissioner] rings up inspector x there in the meeting" (M).
Commanders could therefore be explicitly questioned on their internal management. For a period (it had changed over time as we shall make clear later), the style of leadership of the AC, who was from outside the Met and wanted to provoke, in his own words 'shock and awe', had been described as abrasive by some, brutal by others. In contrast, the performance rituals in the provincial force, such as the monthly performance meetings, were rather more gentle affairs, something apparent from our observations of such events. Chief superintendents can be seriously challenged but never to the degree seen in the MPS. One chief superintendent described the meetings as "not necessarily evil, but not helpful".
This places divisional commanders in an often invidious position: they are both part of the senior staff of the force accountable for all that happens under their command and are often expected to know the detail of individual disposals of people arrested, charged, and so on. Not surprisingly, this can create a highly pressurised environment for those concerned. For example, we were told about one district commander who had "sleepless nights" before performance review meetings and even that his children were aware when such meetings were coming up because of his behaviour! Divisional commanders are at the helm of force 'business units' and where those units are the primary basis of intra-force performance comparisons it is they that are very much in the 'firing-line' within the performance regime, even if the pressure also goes down the line.
Transmitting pressure
We found clear evidence of what we would call the transmission of pressure from senior to front line levels of the organisation. This is where organisational performance targets are transmitted from senior management through to middle management and supervisors.
This cascading process may be translated through two quite varying routes.
The first is the more formulaic definition and monitoring of numerical targets that are pushed down at every level of the organisation through to frontline officers.
Targets set 'on high' are translated into specific actionable objectives for individual frontline officers, leaving little by way of officer discretion in those areas of police activity. For example, one detective chief inspector, one we would classify as very much a 'believer, explained how she sets quite specific action targets for her inspectors and sergeants and sees that those targets are then handed down to front line detectives, in order to help achieve targets for her force area. She also presents this in terms of generating 'healthy competition' within her team of detectives:
"I'll give everybody four objectives and they will give their detectives four objectives.
One of those four objectives could be to detect four burglars per month but that doesn't seem a lot. When you have a low arrest rate around burglary, that's a lot, so it holds people to account… that does inject a little healthy competition." (M).
Some specific operations express perfectly this form of top-down management by numbers. For instance, the MPS has engaged in events given the name of 'Operation CUBO', where activity right across the force is targeted for a single day at a particular offence, such as uninsured car drivers, in this case In this case the intrusion of supervisors and middle managers into operational decision-making derives indirectly from performance targets: the officer is made accountable on a routine basis for his/her individual decisions, especially when they concern designated priority crimes. The process is therefore more indirect than the simple imposition of numerical targets down the line, and usually involves a and longer-term timeframes. Performance regimes at one and the same time demand both short-term returns and long-term improvements in the delivery of policing.
Shortening the time horizon
Terms such as 'quick wins', 'fire-fighting, and 'knee-jerk reactions' were used at various points by our interviewees to capture the short-term pressures that the Such a statement draws attention both to the potential rigidity of the performance regime but also to the leeway that may exist within it. The same officer also mentioned the 'low hanging fruits' and 'easy wins', easy-to-reach targets that, when exploited, enabled him to 'buy time' and water down short-termist pressures.
This is related to an approach that holds it necessary to go behind and beyond the simple figures to assess underlying trends. A chief inspector compared this longer-term approach with the short-termism of the past: England offers a stimulating case-study as 'policing by targets', after having been favoured for two decades, came to be politically rejected at the end of the first This is most evident in the MPS, where an assertive local governance framework is firmly in place and which was very much steeped in an ethos of target-setting and rigorous performance monitoring of the police by local government. This explains, for example, why, despite the adoption of strong elements of the more 'advanced' performance regime at various levels of the force, there are still examples of quite openly short-termist policing decision-making governed by the concern to 'deliver on targets'. The shift from central to local political pressures on police performance is less evident in our provincial force, where, as has been stated, the Police and
Crime Commissioner framework has been in place for a relatively short period of time. However, one dimension is of primary importance for the senior leadership team in the provincial force: performance in national league tables. This is clearly a driver, as a chief superintendent told us: (Reiner, 2013) , or will they enable more reflexive performance systems which are based on a longer term problem-solving ethos? The question has clearly a broader reach, as performance indicators are a way of governing at 'a distance' by setting targets and facilitating audit. Would local political accountability favour a more advanced performance regime? Our research would point tentatively to the negative.
Second, intensive PPM is not just something imposed from without: police managers possess agency and, as we have argued, some middle managers can be seen as 'believers' in the apparent benefits of the 'healthy competition' that comes with the 'naming and shaming' process. This is hardly surprising as a whole generation of senior and middle-ranking police officers have been raised (if not immersed) in a professional environment in which the 'performance culture' is taken as part and parcel of policing in the contemporary era. This relates for us to what might be called the self-imposed dimensions of police performance regimes -the extent to which the police orient their behaviours to target-based performance even when it is not required of them by others external to the organization. 'Believers' are more inclined towards standardised procedures, hierarchical structures of authority, target-setting and routine and regular performance review, which resembles the organisational professionalism analysed by Evetts (2006) . Far from seeing target culture as distorting of real policing, many senior police managers have held it to be essential to the policing function.
Conversely, we have argued that many middle managers and supervisors adopt more critical stances towards police performance regimes that are seen to be time consuming, too 'top-down' and too numbers-focused. This interplay between 'believers' and 'sceptics' creates an interesting cultural dynamic for the workings of PPM and the police service more generally. With regards to the debate on a 'new professionalism' in policing (Fyfe 2013) and the notion of a policing profession associated with reflexivity and evidence-based decision-making -one more comfortable arguably with advanced performance regimes -we would argue that both external and internal forces play to ensure that elements of traditional performance regimes will continue to survive and ensure that police performance management will in turn embody contradictory forces.
